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Stracke: Stracke: Criminal Activity Forfeiture Act

The Criminal Activity Forfeiture Act:
Replete with Constitutional Violations
I. INTRODUCTION

Congress has provided for the forfeiture of practically any type of
property related to an illegal activity in order to take the profit out of crime.'
The federal forfeiture statute dealing specifically with criminal drug activity
is commonly known as the Controlled Substances Act.2 In addition to the
federal forfeiture laws, every state and the District of Columbia has enacted
a statute providing for the forfeiture of "guilty" property.' This Comment

1. See Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 853, 881 (1988 & Supp. 1990);

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1963-1964 (1988).
For an extensive list of forfeiture laws covering specific violations such as money
laundering or transportation of gambling devices, see LEGAL FORFEITURE UNIT, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OUTLINE OF FORFEITURE LAW AND PROCEDURES (1989).'
2. 21 U.S.C. §§ 853, 881. Section 853 is the criminaf forfeiture provision of the
Act while § 881 provides for civil forfeiture.
3. See ALA. CODE § 20-2-93 (1990); ALASKA STAT. §§ 17.30.100-.126 (Supp.
1991); APIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-3413-3415 (1989); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-64-501
(Michie 1987); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11470 (West 1991); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 16-13-501.5 to 511 (Supp. 1991); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 21a-246(d)
(West Supp. 1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 4784 (Supp. 1990); D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 33-552 (Supp. 1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 893.12 (West Supp. 1992); GA. CODE
ANN. § 79A-828 (Harrison Supp. 1989); HAW. REV. STAT. § 329-55 (Supp. 1991);
IDAHO CODE § 37-2744 (Supp. 1991); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 56 1/2, par. 1505 (SmithHurd Supp. 1986); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-6-8.5-5.1 (Bums 1990); IOWA CODE ANN.
§§ 809.1-.21 (West 1991); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-4135 (Supp. 1991); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 218A.405-.460 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32.1550
(West Supp. 1992); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 5821 (West Supp. 1991); MD.
ANN. CODE OF 1957 art. 27, § 297 (1992); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 94C, § 47
(West Supp. 1992); MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 333.7521 (West Supp. 1991); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 609.5311 (West Supp. 1992); Miss CODE ANN. § 41-29-153 (Supp.
1991); Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 513.600-.645 (1986); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 44-12-101 to 104 (1991); NED. REV. STAT. § 28.431 (1989); NEV. REV. STAT. § 453.301 (1991);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 318-B-:17-b (Supp. 1991); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:64-1 to 8 (West 1982 & Supp. 1991); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-31-34 to -36 (Michie 1989);
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 3387-3388 (McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1992); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 90-112 (1990); N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-03.1-36 (1991); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 2933.42-.43 (Anderson Supp. 1991); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 2-503 (Supp.
1992); OR. REV. STAT. § 167.247 (1991); 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 831.1 (Supp.
1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 21-28-5.04 (1989); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-53-520 (Law. Coop. Supp. 1991); S.D. CODIFIED LAWs ANN. § 34-20B-70 (1986); TENN. CODE ANN.
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focuses on the civil forfeiture proceedings 4 of the Controlled Substances Act
and the drug activity portion of Missouri's Criminal Activity Forfeiture Act'
(CAFA).
This Comment traces how the "War on Drugs" has turned a legitimate
criminal penalty into a strong-arm tactic that has been abused by law
enforcement agencies across the country. By allowing law enforcement
agencies to keep the proceeds of forfeited finds, Congress has created an
inherent conflict of interest and an incentive for abuse. Additionally, state
legislatures have defined the forfeitures as civil or quasi-criminal instead of
criminal, which has not only created confusion but has stripped defendants of
the constitutional protections they are entitled to in a criminal proceeding.

§ 39-11-116 (1991); TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 482.153 (West 1992);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37a-6 (1990); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4241 (Supp. 1991;
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-249 (Michie Supp. 1992); WAsH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 69.50.505 (West 1992); W. VA. CODE § 60A-7-703 (1988); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 161.55 (West Supp. 1991); Wyo. STAT. § 35-7-1049 (1988).
4. Forfeitures are either criminal or civil in nature. Criminal forfeiture is an in
personam action which requires the conviction of the accused before there can be any
forfeiture. In a civil forfeiture proceeding, however, the action is in rem; therefore, the
court's jurisdiction is only over the property and no person is involved in the action.

It is the guilt of the property that determines the outcome of the case. The guilt or
innocence of the property's owner is irrelevant. See John Brew, Comment, State and
FederalForfeitureofPropertyInvolved in Drug Transactions,92 DICK. L. REV. 461,

461 n.3 (1988).
5. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 513.600.-645 (1986). Missouri also has an exclusive drug

forfeiture statute found in Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 195.140-.145 (1986).
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Il. BACKGROUND
A. History of ForfeitureLaws6
The concept of forfeiture7 can be traced to Biblical times. 8

More

recently, forfeiture is found in the English common law' concept of the
"deodand."9 A deodand was any object that caused the death of any living
thing.' 0 An in rem proceeding was brought against the "guilty" object which
resulted in its forfeiture to the King." After the abolition of the deodands,
in rem civil proceedings still existed under the Navigational Acts," which
provided for forfeiture upon violation of customs and revenue laws. 3 In
those proceedings, like the civil in rem actions of today, guilt of the property's
owner was not considered by the court.
Forfeiture in such admiralty
proceedings was brought to the United States along with much of England's
common law. In fact, the fifth statute passed by the first session of the United
States Congress permitted the forfeiture of ships when their owners did not
pay the customs duties owed on them.'

6. For a discussion of the history of forfeiture laws, see Brew, supra note 4,at
463-64.
7. Forfeiture is defined as "[l]oss of some right or property as a penalty for some
illegal act." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 650 (6th ed. 1990).

8. "If an ox gore a man or woman and they die, then the ox shall be stoned and
his flesh not eaten; but the owner of the ox shall be quit" [without guilt or further
obligation]. Exodus 21:28-30.
9. Brew, supra note 4, at 463 (citing Jacob J.Finklestein, The Goring Ox:
HistoricalPerspectives on Deodands,Forfeitures,Wrongful Death, and the Western
Notion of Sovereignty, 46 TEMP. L.Q. 169, 180-82 (1973)).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. (citing LAURENCE A. HARPER, THE ENGLISH NAVIGATION LAws: A
SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY EXPERIMENT IN SOCIAL ENGINEERING 387-414 (1964)).
13. Id. (citing I.M. BACON, A NEW ABRIDGEMENT OF THE LAW, ACTIONS
QUITAM 60-62 (6th ed. London 1807)).
14. Id. at 463-64 (citing WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS

261-62 (1st ed. 1765-1769)).
15. See United States v. One 1976 Mercedes Benz 280S, 618 F.2d 453, 461 (7th
Cir. 1980) (citing An Act to Regulate the Collection of Duties, ch. V,§ 36, 1 Stat. 29,
47 (1789)).
OF ENGLAND
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B. Modern Drug ForfeitureLaws
1. Property Subject to Forfeiture
Courts often distinguish between contraband per se and derivative
contraband.' 6 Mere possession of contraband per se is illegal.' 7 For example,
any type of controlled substance is contraband per se."8 Derivative contraband, on the other hand, has a much wider scope. This type of contraband
includes any type of property which is used in, intended to be used in, or
facilitates the commission of the illegal activity. 9 Derivative contraband
may include boats, cars, planes, or homes. Missouri law defines property
subject to forfeiture in the same manner as the federal law.20
2. Procedure to Begin Forfeiture
a. Missouri'sProcedure
Under Missouri's CAFA forfeiture proceeding, the action may commence
before or after the seizure of the property.2 ' The action is filed by either the
local prosecuting attorney or the attorney general. 22 If the petition is filed
before the seizure, it must state what property is to be forfeited, that the
property is within the court's jurisdiction, the grounds for forfeiture, and the
names of all persons known to have or claim an interest in the property. 2
A court then determines ex parte whether there is reasonable cause to believe
the property is forfeitable and whether notice to interested parties prior to
seizure would cause the loss or destruction of the property u If the court
determines that reasonable cause exists to forfeit the property and that notice
could result in the loss or destruction of the property, then the court "shall,"
without any further hearing or notice, issue a writ of seizure.' However, if

16. Brew, supra, note 4, at 465.
17. Id.
18. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(1) (1988).
19. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(2)-(11) (1988 & Supp. 1990).
20. Mo. REV. STAT. § 513.607.1 (1986) provides: "All property of every kind
used or intended for use in the course of, derived from, or realized through criminal
activity is subject to civil forfeiture." Cf 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(1)-(11) (1988 & Supp.
1990).
21. Mo. REV. STAT. § 513.607.3 (1986).
22. Id.

23. Id. § 513.607.5(1).
24. Id.
25. Id.
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the court determines there is reasonable cause, yet notice to interested parties
will not result in loss of the property, then, prior to a hearing that decides
whether a writ of seizure should be issued, the court orders service on all
persons known to have or claim an interest in the property.2 If the court
finds no reasonable cause exists to believe the property is subject to forfeiture,
it "shall" dismiss the action.27
The police, however, may seize property prior to the issuance of a writ
of seizure or the filing of a forfeiture petition.' An authorized law enforcement agent may seize property if the seizure is incident to a lawful arrest,
search, or inspection, provided the officer has probable cause to believe the
property is subject to forfeiture and will be lost or destroyed if it is not
seized. 9 The seizure must be reported by the officer to the prosecuting
attorney of the county in which the seizure was made or to the attorney
general within three days.3 ° Within five days of notice of the seizure, the
prosecuting attorney or the attorney general must file a petition for forfeiture. 3' This petition must contain all the required elements of a pre-seizure
petition plus the date and place of the seizure.32 Regardless of whether the
seizure is effected before or after the issuance of notice, the agency responsible for the seizure must prove all the allegations in the petition. 33 Every
person known to have or claim an interest in the property is served with notice
of the forfeiture proceeding if they have not been previously notified. 3
b. The FederalAct's Procedure
There are two types of forfeiture procedures provided for under the
federal act. 35 The type and amount of property involved determines which
procedure applies.36 Either procedure is available to local law enforcement
if they allow a federal agency like the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
or the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) to adopt the forfeiture.37 Federal

26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. § 513.607.5(2).

29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. § 513.607.6.
35. 21 U.S.C. § 881(b), (f) (1988 & Supp. 1990).

36. Id. § 881(f); 19 U.S.C. § 1607(a)(1) (Supp. 1990).
37. Louis J. Rose & Tim Poor, Confiscations: PoliceDepartment UnderAttack,
ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Oct. 6, 1991.
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adoption of a state forfeiture allows state law enforcement to avoid state
forfeiture laws. Missouri law mandates that the proceeds of forfeiture be
directed to schools rather than law enforcement agencies.' By using federal
adoption, local law enforcement agencies have been able to evade Missouri
law and keep the forfeited funds for their own use rather than direct funds to
schools.
(1) Summary Forfeiture
This procedure operates in much the same way as the Missouri CAFA
proceeding. However, there are several distinctions. First, contraband per se
may be summarily forfeited.39 Summary forfeiture allows the government
to seize and retain contraband per se without any judicial proceeding. Second,40
the property may be forfeited in an administrative forfeiture proceeding.
If the property's value is $500,000 or less 41 or, regardless of the its value, it
was used to import, export, or otherwise transport or store drugs, the
administrative forfeiture proceeding applies. 42 This proceeding begins by
sending a notice of seizure to any persons believed to have an interest in the
property.43 The notice informs recipients of their right to contest forfeitures
and describes the necessary steps to contest." The notice refers to the
requirements for filing a claim and a bond in order to challenge the forfeiture. 45 The amount of the bond is ten percent of the appraised value of the
property or $5,000, whichever is less.46 The notice also contains a verified
claim form that the interested party must file within ten days after the property

38. Reorganized Sch. Dist. No. 7 Lafayette County v. Douthit, 799 S.W.2d 591,
593 (Mo. 1990).
39. 21 U.S.C. § 881(1) (Supp. 1990).
40. 19 U.S.C. § 1607 (Supp. 1990).
41. Id. § 1607(a)(1).
42. Id. § 1607(a)(3). Note that 21 U.S.C. § 881(d) incorporates the customs laws
containing forfeiture proceedings. Section 881(d) reads:
The provisions of law relating to the seizure, summary, and judicial
forfeiture, and condemnation of property for violation of the customs laws
...shall apply to seizures and forfeitures incurred, or alleged to have been
incurred, under any of the provisions of this subchapter, insofar as
applicable and not inconsistent with the provisions hereof.
21 U.S.C. § 881(d) (Supp. 1990).
43. David B. Smith, The Civil Forfeiture Case's CriticalBeginning, 35 PRAC.
LAw., July 1989, at 57, 59.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 59-60.
46. Id. at 60.
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is seized.47 The claim must assert that the claimant has an interest in the
property to prove standing to protest the forfeiture.4 Upon receipt of a
verified claim, the government has sixty days to file its complaint. 49 The
claimant must file an answer to the government's complaint within twenty
days of the date when the claim was filed5
(2) JudicialForfeiture
A judicial forfeiture proceeding may be filed for property valued over
$500,00051 or, regardless of value, for property upon which a claim and bond
has been filed. 2 There are no bond or claim requirements in a judicial
forfeiture proceeding. The proceeding begins when the United States files its
complaint. The filing of this complaint generally satisfies the government's
initial burden of proof5 3 that probable cause exists for forfeiture. 4 The
mere allegation of facts supporting the assertion of probable cause shifts the
ultimate burden of persuasion to the defendant or interested party to prove by
a preponderance of the evidence that the property is not subject to forfeiture.55 If the party fails to offer evidence or does not meet this burden of
proof, the government is entitled to summary judgment and the property will
be forfeited.56

47. Id. at 63.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id.
Id.
Id.
19 U.S.C. § 1610 (1988).

52. 19 U.S.C. § 1608 (1988).
53. Anton R. Valukas & Thomas P. Walsh, Forfeitures: When Uncle Sam Says
You Can't Take It with You, LiNG., Winter 1988, at 31, 34.

54. Id. See also 19 U.S.C. § 1615 (1988); United States v. $38,600.00 in U.S.
Currency, 784 F.2d 694, 697-98 (5th Cir. 1986).
55. Valukas & Walsh, supra note 53, at 34. See also 19 U.S.C. § 1615 (1988);
United States v. $50,000 in U.S. Currency, 757 F.2d 103, 105 (6th Cir. 1985).
56. Valukas & Walsh, supra note 53, at 34. See also United States v.
$5,644,540.00 in U.S. Currency, 799 F.2d 1357, 1362 (9th Cir. 1986).
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(3) State's Use of FederalAdoption 7
The federal adoption process begins with the seizure of property by local
police.58 The authority for that seizure is found in a state's forfeiture
laws.59 After seizing property, local law enforcement requests a federal
agency to adopt the seizure.' Most seizures are adopted by the DEA or the
FBI."' If the agency agrees, it takes the seized goods and notifies the
owner. 62 The forfeiture process is then under the control of federal
prosecutors. The procedure used under federal adoption is virtually the same
as summary or judicial forfeiture procedures. 63 The crucial difference,
however, is that through federal adoption, forfeiture proceeds can be returned
to the law enforcement agency responsible for the seizure. Under a 1990
Missouri Supreme Court ruling, all forfeiture proceeds obtained under the state
law must be allocated to the state's schools.6 Use of federal adoption
allows law enforcement agencies to circumvent the 1990 ruling.
C. How ForfeitureReally Works
There are many areas of the forfeiture statute which could be improved,
This Comment will focus on a few of the areas in the greatest need of reform.
Those points include (1) the conflict of interest caused by the allowance of
federal adoption in a state which mandates forfeited proceeds be given to the
state's schools, 65 (2) the prosecutorial abuse manifested in delays and

57. For a discussion of how the adoption process functions, see Rose & Poor,
supra note 37.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See supra notes 40-57 and accompanying text.
64. Reorganized Sch. Dist. No. 7 Lafayette County v. Douthit, 799 S.W.2d 591
(Mo. 1990). Prior to this ruling Missouri Revised Statute § 513.623 (1986) directed
forfeited proceeds to be contributed to the children's trust fund. The court in Douthit
held that statute violated Article IX, § 7 of the Missouri Constitution which requires
"proceeds of penalties, forfeitures and fines collected ... for any breach of the penal
laws of the state ... [be] available for school purposes, and none other." Douthit, 799
S.W.2d at 593. (quoting Mo. CONST. art IX, § 7). Note that in order to reach this
finding the court classified forfeitures under CAFA as penal in nature. Id. at 594.
65. See infra notes 68-84 and accompanying text.
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apparent bribery,' and (3) the lack of adequate protections for forfeiture
defendants due to the classification of the forfeiture penalty as civil.6 7
1. Prosecutorial Abuse
Although Missouri law requires that all forfeiture proceeds must be
allocated to state schools,6 many proceeds ultimately return to the law
enforcement agency responsible for the forfeiture. This re-routing of funds is
accomplished through the adoption procedure.6 9 No federal regulations
prevent law enforcement agencies from ultimately receiving forfeited proceeds.
Therefore, under the federal adoption process, local agencies are allowed to
retain the fruits of their labor. This practice creates an inherent conflict of
interest for law enforcement agencies. The most honest officer may be
tempted to enhance a department's budget by waiting to search a suspect until
the suspect is in his home or vehicle rather than a place without forfeitable
property.
It is impossible to determine accurately the amount of abuse of the civil
forfeiture laws; however, the media has covered many examples of abuse. 70
Because the law does not require a conviction of the criminally accused,
forfeiture actions may continue even if all criminal charges are dropped. This
relationship between the two causes of actions creates the potential for great
abuse.
For example, a Mexico, Missouri man, who was never charged with a
crime, paid $5,000 to prosecutors in exchange for their dismissal of a twoyear-old forfeiture action against his .farm.71 Although a small patch of
marijuana was found growing on the man's 115-acre farm, prosecutors never
found any evidence that the owner was aware of the patch.72 No charges
were ever filed against the man, but prosecutors continued to attempt to take
his farm away. 73

66. See infra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
67. See infra notes 137-78 and accompanying text.
68. Douthit, 799 S.W.2d at 593.
69. For a discussion of the adoption procedure, see supra notes 58-64 and

accompanying text.
70. The examples which follow are from a series of articles by Tim Poor and
Louis J. Rose which appeared in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch from October 6 to
October 11, 1991.
71. Tim Poor & Louis J. Rose, Farmer Paid $5,000 To Thwart Land Grab:
County Was Set To Take Farm-ButNot Charge Owners, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH,
Oct 9, 1991.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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The payment of any sum of money in return for dropping charges or a
forfeiture action reeks of legal extortion. The purpose of the forfeiture laws
is to take the profit out of crime, and it is that very purpose which is being
violated by the actions of prosecutors such as those involved in the Mexico,
Missouri case. If an accused may buy her way out of trouble, it hinders the
purpose of the forfeiture laws. An accused should not retain property that is
truly "guilty" merely by making a contribution. Permitting such extortion
payments taints the criminal process.
There are other cases in which a defendant has bought his way out of
trouble. Jeff Jepsen, a Kirkwood, Missouri resident was arrested for
possession of marijuana. 74 Police seized his van during the arrest. 75 The
prosecutor, Martin Mazzei, allowed Jepsen to plead guilty to a misdemeanor
drug charge, which was reduced from a felony charge, and he was allowed to
keep his van. 76 Jepsen paid the prosecutor's office $3,000.77 The payment
was not reflected in the files of the criminal case.7' Over a year after
Jepsen's arrest, a newly-elected prosecutor formally dropped the forfeiture
action because she felt the case had been "'tainted' by the payments." 79 The
county sheriff called the actions of Mazzei "a bribe, plain and simple.",
Surprisingly, even the former prosecutor agreed that the payment of money
"gave the appearance of suspects buying their way out of charges."81 Even
though the prosecutor responsible for "settlement" had moral reservations
about the transaction, he continued the practice after the Missouri Bar
Administration Advisory Committee issued a March 2, 1988 opinion
approving of the practice.82
The chairman of the advisory committee wrote: "'We view this in the
same nature as negotiating the amount of a fine to be levied against a criminal
defendant and do not find anything unethical in a prosecuting attorney
simultaneously negotiating the criminal plea and the disposition of a civil

74. 'Tim Poor & Louis J.Rose, ProsecutorDealtAwayChargeOnMarijuanaFor
$3,000: 'All They Wanted Was Money Out of the Deal,' Says Suspect, ST. Louis
POST-DISPATCH, Oct 10, 1991.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. The current prosecutor made a series of $1,000 donations to three county
school superintendents only a few months before his re-election campaign. He lost the
election. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. This statement was made by Sheriff Bob Kent of Crawford County,
Missouri regarding the actions of former prosecutor Martin Mazzei. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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forfeiture action.... "' However, there are important differences between
negotiating a fine and negotiating a criminal plea while a civil forfeiture
action is pending. First, fines are generally determined after the defendant is
found guilty. The negotiation of a criminal plea in conjunction with a civil
forfeiture action occurs before a trial even begins. Further, a trial may never
occur if the charges are dropped or were never filed in the first place.
Second, prosecutors do not benefit from the amount of the fine because they
are not the recipient of that money. In forfeiture cases, however, the local law
enforcement agency may benefit from the donation made by the accused.
Although the prosecutor does not personally receive the money, a definite
relationship exists between the local prosecutor and the local law enforcement
agency.
Obviously law enforcement agencies approve of the forfeiture statutes,
especially when they benefit from them financially. A prosecutor who does
not cooperate with the local law enforcement agency might have a difficult
time performing his or her job. As one prosecutor stated, "'[t]he last thing a
prosecuting attorney wants to do is anger law enforcement."'84 Because the
law enforcement agency may receive the benefits of any "contribution," a
blatant conflict of interest arises for prosecutors acting in this dual role. Due
to this lack of objectivity, prosecutors should either not participate in the
bargaining process, or they should not directly or indirectly benefit from any
proceeds derived from the bargaining process.
2. Delay of the Forfeiture Process
In contrast to the swiftness of the seizure process, the actual forfeiture
process may drag on for years. Unfortunately there are no guidelines or
requirements in CAFA stating when the actual forfeiture should be completed.
This lack of guidance has lead to another form of abuse in the forfeiture
process. The St. Louis Post-Dispatch reported a case where, in order to free
their land of title problems, the owners had to agree not to sue the government
before the government would drop the forfeiture action against their
property.8 s Other landowners also paid money in exchange for dropping a

83. Id.
84. Id. This statement was made by former Crawford County, Missouri
prosecutor Martin Mazzei. Id.
85. Tim Poor & Louis J. Rose, Undue Process: U.S. Kept Trying To Take Home
After Officials Dropped Charges, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Oct 6, 1991. Even
though the Adair County prosecutors had dropped all charges against Matt and Sheri
Farrell, federal prosecutors continued to try to take their land. Id. Federal prosecutors
did not drop their case until ten months after filing suit, and not until the Farrells
signed an agreement not to sue the government. Id.
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two-year-old forfeiture action against their property.s6 By allowing delay in
the prosecution of forfeiture actions, the forfeiture laws give too much
discretion to prosecutors. Justice is better served by the implementation of a
time limitation for prosecutors to commence a forfeiture action. Shorter
delays in the process would result in less opportunity and less incentive for
bribery because defendants would have a quicker opportunity to prove their
property's innocence and attain its return. Just as defendants in criminal cases
have a right to a speedy trial, so should defendants in forfeiture actions. The
following discussion addresses the similarities between criminal defendants
and forfeiture defendants. These similarities create a need to give forfeiture
defendants the same rights criminals defendants have.
III. COMMENT: REFORMING A GOOD CONCEPT
Forfeiture is an excellent tool to fight crime, especially drug crimes;
however, forfeiture's current use is often unfair. Several issues must be
reformed in order to make the process fair. The question as to what may
constitute probable cause to seize forfeitable property must be reevaluated.
Improved notice requirements would better protect the rights of interested
parties. Conflicts between criminal and civil proceedings must be resolved.
The system's delay in processing forfeiture actions must be shortened.
87
Finally, the interests of innocent property owners or tenants by the entirety
must be better protected.

86. Tim Poor & Louis J. Rose, supra note 71. Sherwood Craghead of Audrain
County, Missouri thought prosecutors had dropped the forfeiture action against him
until he tried to sell his farm and he was told there was a lien on his property
preventing him from selling it. Id. Craghead then decided to pay the Audrain County
Sheriff's Department $5,000 in exchange for the prosecutor dropping his case. Id.
87. See infra notes 187-89 and accompanying text.
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A. Forfeitureis not a Civil Action

1. Criminal Versus Civil Classification'
The intent of the forfeiture laws is to punish; a forfeiture action is
basically criminal in nature and should be treated as such. 9 No such action
as a "civil forfeiture proceeding" should exist. Treating all forfeiture
provisions as criminal more accurately reflects their nature and ensures that
forfeiture defendants are provided with constitutional protections.
The United States Supreme Court has expounded a series of tests to
distinguish between a criminal and civil action. The first test was established
in Helvering v. Mitchell.' In Mitchell, the Court stated that, in order to
determine whether a statute is criminal or civil, courts should attempt to
determine whether Congress intended to create a criminal or a civil penalty. 91
Before the limits of the Court's deference to Congress could be tested, the
Court revised the test in subsequent holdings.9 2 The Court, in Kennedy v.
Mendoza-Martinez,93 set forth a two-part test to determine whether a statute
is civil or criminal. The first prong of the test requires the court to examine
Congress' intent in enacting the statute.94 If the court determines that
Congress intended the statute to be civil, then, under the second prong, the
court must determine if Congress can constitutionally characterize the statute
as civil. 95 The court weighs seven factors in this determination:
[F]irst, whether the statute creates an affirmative disability or restraint;
second, whether the underlying behavior has been historically punished as
a crime; third, whether the statute requires scienter; fourth, whether the
statute promotes retribution and/or deterrence; fifth, whether the underlying
behavior is currently a crime, sixth, whether there is an alternative, nonpenal purpose behind the 96
law; and seventh, whether the law is well-tailored
to its non-penal purpose.

88. The criminal/civil classification analysis which follows originated in the cases
cited, and Michael Schecter further developed the analysis and applied it to forfeitures.
See Michael Schecter, Note, Fearand Loathingand the ForfeitureLaws, 75 CORNELL
L. REV. 1151 (1990). Schecter argues that forfeiture defendants should enjoy the same
rights as criminal defendants. Id. at 1160-63, 1182.
89. Id. at 1155.
90. 303 U.S. 391 (1938).
91. Id. at 402. See also Schecter, supra note 88, at 1157.
92. Schecter, supra note 88, at 1157-58.
.93. 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
94. Id. at 169.
95. Schecter, supra note 88, at 1158.
96. Id. at 1158 (citing Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168-69).
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Many years after Mendoza-Martinez, the Supreme Court established a
new test.' In United States v. Ward'8 the Court maintained the first prong
of the Mendoza-Martinez test, but changed the second prong." The seven
factors of the Mendoza-Martinez test were replaced with an examination of
whether the "statutory penalty is so punitive that the law should be considered
criminal."'00 However, the court may override Congressional intent to create
a civil statute only upon the "clearest of proof."' 10 This burden gives greater
12
deference to Congressional intent than did the Mendoza-Martinez test. 0
Neither test, however, has achieved prominence; rather, courts seem to
consider them as alternatives.0 3
4
The Supreme Court has haphazardly applied both tests to forfeituresY
Rather than uniformly deciding that all forfeitures are either criminal or civil,
the Court has chosen to decide the issue depending on what constitutional
protection the defendant claims. 05 This approach has resulted in the
classification of some forfeitures as quasi-criminal.' 6 A quasi-criminal
classification leaves forfeiture defendants with a patchwork of criminal
constitutional protections. As one author has noted, the Constitution never
states that one criminal right is more important than another."0 7 Therefore,
it makes no sense that forfeiture defendants are entitled to some rights and not
other rights. They should be entitled to all the constitutional protections given
to defendants or to none of them. The classification of all forfeitures as
criminal solves this dilemma.
2. The Necessary Classification of the
Controlled Substances Act and CAFA as Criminal
The first prong of both the Mendoza-Martinez and the Ward tests
"requires the examination of Congressional intent.""° The legislative history
of the federal act states that it was enacted as a civil statuteY 9 CAFA

97. Id.
98. 448 U.S. 242 (1980).
99. Schecter, supra note 88, at 1158 (citing Ward, 448 U.S. at 248-49).
100. Id.
101. Id. (citing Ward, 448 U.S. at 248-49).
102. Id. at 1158-59.
103. Id. at 1159.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1159 n.62.
107. Id. at 1159.
108. Id. at 1160.
109. H.R. REP. No. 1444, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1970), reprinted in 1970
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actually states that the legislative intent is to treat forfeiture as civil in
nature.'
Hence, whether the Controlled Substances Act or CAFA is
criminal turns on the second prong of the tests. Despite the newer Ward test,
some courts continue to apply the Mendoza-Martindz test. If a court chooses
to apply the Mendoza-Martinez test, the court balances the seven factors to
determine whether to characterize the statutes as criminal. To override the
legislative intent to create a civil statute, the court must find the statute
"sufficiently criminal in nature." ''
2
The first factor is whether the statute creates an affirmative disability."
The Court in Mendoza-Martinez did not define this term."3 However, both
the federal law and CAFA prevent interested parties from claiming title to
forfeited property and from enjoying their property rights.1 4 This definitely qualifies as an affirmative disability. 1 5
The second factor asks whether the underlying behavior has been
punished as a crime throughout history."' Possession of drugs has been a
crime since the nineteenth century." 7 The federal law and CAFA may
require forfeitures for more crimes than just drug possession. For example,
in Missouri, offenses against the person, robbery, arson, and gambling may
result in forfeiture." 8
The third factor is whether the statute contains a mens rea requirement." 9 Neither the Act nor CAFA require a direct showing of mental
state; however, because the ultimate burden of proof is on the interested party
to prove their innocence, a failure to show an absence of mens rea will result
in the forfeiture of their property.
The fourth factor is whether the statute "promotes retribution or
deterrence, which would make the offence more criminal than civil."12 ' The
forfeiture laws were intended to deter illegal drug activity by taking the profit

U.S.C.C.A.N. 4566, 4570-71.
110. Mo. REV. STAT. § 513.607 (1986).
111. Schecter, supra note 88, at 1160-61.
112. Id. at 1161. A disability is normally defined as a restraint that prevents an
individual from enjoying "ordinary legal rights." Id. at 1161 n.71 (quoting BLACK'S
LAWv DICrIONARY 415 (5th ed. 1979)).
113. Id. at 1161.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Mo. REv. STAT. § 513.605(3)(a)-(p) (1986).

119. Schecter, supra note 88, at 1161.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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out of the activity. Confiscated goods and profits are placed in a state fund
or even in law enforcement budgets; this practice serves as some retribution
for society.'2
The fifth factor "examines whether the underlying behavior is currently
a crime." 123 Drug possession and drug trafficking are obviously both current
crimes. Therefore, forfeiture is not necessary to prosecute guilty defendants
because they can be tried for their underlying crimesY"
The sixth factor is the only factor which bolsters the argument that the
legislature intended to create a civil statute.' 25 There is an alternative, nonpenal purpose to the forfeiture laws. 126 That purpose is to deter drug
12 7
smuggling by not allowing smugglers to keep their illegally gained assets.
A criminal forfeiture law, however, could still serve this important purpose.
The tradeoff means that all forfeiture defendants would have constitutional
protections. If the state can prove their guilt, the state can take their goods.
This tradeoff is worth making.
The last factor is "whether the law creates a penalty that is well-tailored
to the alternative non-penal goal."' 2 If law enforcement agencies only used
forfeiture laws to bring down major drug suppliers, then one could argue that
the forfeiture law is well-tailored to its non-penal goal. 12 9 However, the
forfeiture laws are often used against drug users and small-scale drug
dealers. 30 Though it might seem this is good, it is not the use that legislators contemplated when they drafted these forfeiture laws. Hence, the law is
not well-tailored to its non-penal goals.
Upon considering all seven factors, courts should rule that forfeiture laws
are criminal in nature and override the legislative intent to the contrary. 3
Regardless of what legislatures intended to create, they created a criminal
penalty.
If a court chose to apply the Ward test, the determinative issue is whether
the penalty is so punitive so as to negate the legislature's intent to enact a

122. Id. at 1162.
123. Id.
124. Id.

125. Id.
126. Id. Schecter argues that the non-penal purpose should not be the determining
factor because almost every criminal statute has an alternative non-penal purpose. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.

129. Id. at 1162-63.
130. See, e.g., Louis J. Rose & Tim Poor, Domestic DisputeLeads to Forfeit,ST.
Louis POST-DISPATCH, Oct. 8, 1991.
131. See Schecter, supra note 88, at 1162-63.
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civil statute.13' Due to the rising number of cases where a significant
amount of money or property is forfeited in relation to the amount of drug
involvement, 33 forfeitures have become so punitive in nature that they meet
the Ward standard. Forfeiture as a punishment is out of proportion with many
crimes which allow forfeiture as a penalty. This is especially true when the
defendant is never charged with a crime or when the charges are dropped due
to a lack of evidence. Law enforcement officers and prosecutors throughout
the state abuse the forfeiture laws precisely because forfeiture is a stiff penalty
with an easier burden of proof.
Missouri may have already taken the first step to reclassify forfeitures as
criminal. The Supreme Court of Missouri in Reorganized School District.No.
7 v. Douthit" declared the forfeiture statute "manifestly penal."1 35 The
court, however, did not see a conflict between this holding and the continued
classification of forfeiture as a civil proceeding. 36 Upon further consideration, the court will hopefully see the inherent inconsistency in finding
forfeitures to be penal but not calling for an end to civil forfeitures.
B. What Classifying Forfeitureas Criminal Means to Defendants
1. Due Process Rights
The Constitution guarantees certain rights to all criminal defendants. If
the forfeiture laws are labeled criminal rather than civil, then forfeiture
defendants would also be guaranteed these rights. The classification of
forfeiture as criminal would mean: (1) "the state cannot shift certain elements
of the state's case onto the defendant," '37 (2) "the statute must normally
13 (3) "the prosecutor cannot force the
contain a mens rea requirement,""
defendant to testify against himself,' 39 and (4) "the prosecutor cannot use
evidence against the defendant if the state obtains it in violation of the
defendant's fourth amendment rights."' 40 Classifying all forfeiture actions
as criminal eliminates the past confusion caused by courts' piecemeal
approach to the issue.

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id.
See Rose and Poor, supra note 130.
799 S.W.2d 591 (Mo. 1990).
Id. at 594.
Id.
Schecter, supra note 88, at 1164 (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970)).
Id. (citing United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978)).
Id. (citing U.S. CONST. amend. V (self-incrimination clause)).
Id. (citing Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914)).
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2. Why Present Forfeiture Laws Must Grant Forfeiture Defendants
Their Constitutional Rights
The United States Supreme Court, in In re Winship,41 interpreted the
"due process clause to require the state to prove 'beyond a reasonable doubt
... every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is
charged. ' ' 142 However, as the law reads today, the government needs only
probable cause to subject the defendant's property to forfeiture.1 43 Once this
easy burden is satisfied, the defendant must then prove his innocence or forfeit
his property. 144 The applicable level of proof in both instances is by a
preponderance of the evidence. 145 This burden of proof is unconstitutional
if forfeitures are viewed as criminal in nature because it violates two
constitutional protections granted to all criminal defendants. First, in a
criminal proceeding, the state must prove its case beyond all reasonable doubt,
not by a mere preponderance of the evidence.1 46 Second, the state must
prove all the essential elements of its case. The Supreme Court, in United
States v. United States Gypsum Co.,147 held that mens rea is an essential
element of the majority of crimes.14' However, in forfeiture actions, the
state does not have to prove mens rea. The burden of proving a lack of mens
rea is on the defendant in forfeiture actions. 4 9 Courts use the quasi-criminal
classification to conclude this shift of burden is allowable!5 This classification should not be allowed. Courts should not create a new combination of
rights by coining a new phrase for a crime. Forfeiture is a criminal action and
forfeiture defendants should receive all the constitutional protections granted
criminal defendants.

141. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
142. Schecter, supra note 88, at 1165. See also Winship, 397 U.S. at 364.
143. Schecter, supra note 88, at 1165. See also 21 U.S.C. § 881(b)(3) (1988);
Mo. REV. STAT. § 513.607.5(1) (1986).
144. Schecter, supra note 88, at 1165. See also 19 U.S.C. § 1915 (1988).
145. See, e.g., United States v. One 1977 Lincoln Mark V, 453 F. Supp. 1388,
1391 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
146. Schecter, supra note 88, at 1165.
147. 438 U.S. 422 (1978).
148. Schecter, supra note 88, at 1166. See also United States Gypsum Co., 438
U.S. at 436 (quoting Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 500 (1951)).
149. Schecter, supra note 88, at 1166.
150. Id. See, e.g., cases cited id. at 1166 n.100.
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3. What Due Process Requires Regarding Burden of Proof 5 '
The Supreme Court, in Mathews v. Eldridge,"2 established a test for
determining the constitutionality of a challenged procedural rule.'5 3 To
determine what due process requires, a court must analyze three factors:
"first, the governmental interest served by the challenged procedure; second,
the individual interest affected by the official action; and third, the risk of an
erroneous deprivation and the probable value of additional procedural
safeguards."1 54 Missouri courts have applied the Mathews test. 55 This
Comment views this as the appropriate test to determine whether shifting the
burden of proof in a forfeiture action violates due process.
The first prong of the Mathews test examines how the challenged
procedures "advance legitimate governmental objectives.0 56 Shifting the
burden of proof to the defendant encourages the government to use forfeiture
because it lessens the government's evidentiary burden. 7 Forfeiture itself
advances three important governmental interests. 8 First, "it generates and
protects governmental revenues."' 59 Second, forfeiture punishes people who
use their property to commit
crimes. 16 Third, forfeiture "regulates the
1
'
property.0
of
unlawful use
The second prong examines the private interests affected by the
forfeiture. 62 Forfeiture deprives a property owner of all of his rights in that
property.'63 The third prong considers the "risk of an erroneous deprivation

151. For a comprehensive discussion of due process requirements regarding
burden of proof, see Peter Petrou, Note, Due Process Implications of Shifting the
Burden of Proofin ForfeitureProceedingsArising Out of Illegal Drug Transactions,
1984 DuKE L.J. 822.

152. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
153. Petrou, supra note 151, at 829. See also Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
154. Petrou, supra note 151, at 829. See also Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.

155. State ex rel Cook v. Saynes, 713 S.W.2d 258, 262-63 (Mo. 1986).
156. Petrou, supra note 151, at 829-30.
157. Id. at 830.
158. Id.
159. Id. (citing Gordon Chang, Note, Forfeitures-DueProcess-Supreme Court
Upholds ForfeitureofInnocent Owner's Property Without PriorNotice and Hearing,
60 CORNELL L. REV. 467, 478 (1975)).
160. Id. See also United States v. Rush, 666 F.2d 10, 11 n.1 (2d Cir. 1981).
161. See Petrou supra note 151, at 830. Senator Nunn, who sponsored the bill

that amended the Drug Control Act to include the forfeiture of illegal drug proceeds,
listed all three of the above objectives as purposes of the amendment. Id. at 830 n.76
(citing 124 CONG. REC. 23,055 (1978)).
162. Id. at 836.
163. Id. See also 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (1988 & Supp. 1990).
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under the challenged procedures." 164 The acceptability of the risk of error
depends on "the type of facts to be discerned,"6 "the adequacy of the
existing safeguards," 1" and "the benefit of additional procedural safeguards." 67 According to one author, the "best allocation of the burden
maximizes protection for the individual against an erroneous deprivation, but
6
minimizes obstacles to ... drug law enforcement by the government. 0 8
Currently the defendant in a forfeiture action bears the ultimate burden
of persuasion once the government shows probable cause for forfeiting the
defendant's property. A better approach would be for the government to
maintain its initial burden of proof by a showing of probable cause.169 Once
the government meets its burden, the burden would shift to the defendant to
show a reasonable explanation refuting the showing of probable cause.'7
The ultimate burden of disproving the defendant's explanation would rest with
the government.17 ' This allocation of the burden of proof would best protect
72
against an erroneous deprivation of property.1
4. Double Jeopardy and Collateral Estoppel Issues
Ordinarily, a defendant can be prosecuted for the same crime only once
because of the constitutional protection against double jeopardy.' Additionally, the doctrine of collateral estoppel does not apply to forfeiture actions
because of the different burdens of proof between a criminal action and a
subsequent civil action. 74 The Supreme Court has held that a forfeiture
action, after a failed criminal action, is not double jeopardy.' 7" The most
serious consequence is not that a defendant may be punished twice with
criminal sanctions and forfeited goods. The problem is that a defendant
acquitted of criminal charges may still forfeit her property under a civil

164. Petrou, supra note 151, at 838. See also Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
165. Petrou, supra note 151, at 838 (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 343).
166. Id. (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 345-46).

167. Id. (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 346-47).
168. See Petrou, supra note 151, at 841.
169. This approach was originally suggested by Peter Petrou. See id. at 840-43.
170. Id. at 841.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 843.
173. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
174. Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 397 (1938).
175. Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368 (1983) (upholding the state's right to
impose plural sanctions because the question is one of legislative intent rather than one
of double jeopardy); Various Items of Personal Property v. United States, 282 U.S.
577, 581 (1931).
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forfeiture statute because of the differing burdens of proof. This possibility
creates a potential for great abuse. Because law enforcement agencies can
ultimately obtain goods they have previously seized, the agencies have a much
greater incentive to concentrate their efforts on the forfeiture action. This is
especially true when the criminal case is weak. This potential for abuse could
be eliminated by requiring that a criminal conviction be a prerequisite to a
forfeiture action.
However, the Supreme Court, in United States v. One Assortment of 89
Firearms,176 made it clear that neither collateral estoppel nor double jeopardy barred a civil forfeiture proceeding initiated after an acquittal on related
criminal charges.' 77 This ruling was based on the assumption that the
forfeiture proceeding is civil in nature. What happens, however, if the
forfeiture is considered criminal? Double jeopardy will occur. The double
jeopardy clause prohibits "punishing twice, or attempting a second time to
punish criminally, for the same offense."'' 8 A possible solution to avoid
double jeopardy is to include the provision for forfeiture in the underlying
crime. This allows for forfeiture of guilty goods in the same way that fines
are provided for in the sentencing process.
5. How to Prevent Prosecutors From Unduly Delaying
the Forfeiture Hearing
Despite authority that "notice and an opportunity to be heard must be
provided by the state in a meaningful manner prior to deprivation of a
protected interest,' 7 9 defendants have experienced major delays in some
cases.
The Supreme Court, in Barker v. Wingo,'" supplied a test for determining whether due process was denied a defendant whose trial was eighteen
months after his property was seized.'
Under Barker, a court must weigh
four factors to determine if there has been an undue delay: (1) the length of
the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant's assertion of his
right to a speedy determination; and (4) prejudice. 8 2 In applying Barker,
however, courts have upheld delays as long as fourteen months from the time

176. 465 U.S. 354 (1984).
177. Id. at 361. See also One Lot Emerald Cut Stones & One Ring v. United
States, 409 U.S. 232, 234-35 (1972).
178. Helvering, 303 U.S. at 399.
179. State v. Eberenz, 805 S.W.2d 359, 361 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991) (quoting State
ex rel. Williams v. Marsh, 626 S.W.2d 223, 230 (Mo. 1982)).
180. 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
181. Id. at 530.
182. Id.
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of seizure to the institution of the forfeiture action.1 13 There are very few
acceptable reasons the government could offer for delaying commencement of
a forfeiture suit. The majority of delays are unnecessary and deprive
defendants of their property without legitimate reason. Currently there are no
guidelines as to when prosecutors must bring forfeiture actions after property
has been seized. Criminal defendants are constitutionally guaranteed the right
to a speedy trial; forfeiture defendants deserve the same treatment. Justice
would be better served by adding such a requirement to all forfeiture laws.
6. Do Away with the Conflict of Interest for Law Enforcement
The simple solution is to follow the law as it exists in Missouri.'84 A
requirement that proceeds of forfeiture actions be contributed to the school
fund rather than to a law enforcement agency will ensure the objectivity of the
prosecutorial process. To ensure this result, Missouri should ban the use of
federal adoption. The use of federal adoption gives law enforcement more
incentive to use the forfeiture laws, but the direct benefit from the process
provides the wrong incentive. Through federal adoption local law enforcement officers and prosecutors throughout Missouri have supplemented their
budgets with $11.23 million from drug-related seizures during the past three
and a half years.'8 Allowing enforcement agencies to supplement their
budgets through forfeiture proceeds is akin to "bounty hunting."'
7. Forfeiture and the Rights of Third Parties
The question of whether property held in tenancy by the entirety is
subject to forfeiture seems to have been resolved by the courts. Prior to these
rulings, it would have been possible for innocent husbands or wives to find
themselves tenants with the United States government if property was
forfeited. Courts have ruled, however, that if the five unities of tenancy by
the entirety187 have not been broken and one spouse is innocent of the

183. See United States v. $47,980 in Canadian Currency, 804 F.2d 1085, 1088-89
(9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1072 (1987).
184. Mo. REV. STAT. § 513.623 (1986).
185. Rose & Poor, supra note 37. For a breakdown by city and county law
enforcement agencies proceeds from forfeitures, see id.
186. Tim Poor & Louis J.Rose, Seizures Aid Newton County: ForfeitureCases
Have Netted Sheriffs Office $116,000, ST. Louis POST-DiSPATCH, Oct. 7, 1991. The
analogy to bounty hunting was made by Dan Viets, a defense attorney from Columbia,
Missouri. Id.
187. See United States v. One Parcel of Real Estate, 751 F. Supp. 1538, 1539
(S.D. Fla. 1990). The five unities required to be present to create a tenancy by the
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accused conduct, then each spouse's interest comprises the whole or entirety
of the property and not a divisible part; hence, the estate is nonseverable.'"
Essentially, the government is without recourse because the property is held
by both spouses equally. To grant the government an interest in the property
would alienate and convey one spouse's interest without his or her consent.
The government may, however, place a lien on the property and take the
guilty spouse's interest should the property ever be divided by divorce, death
of the other spouse, or some other event."8 9 For property held other than by
tenancy by the entirety the law in not as clear or as fair.
The federal act provides that property may not be forfeited from someone
who had a preexisting interest in the property and who was not aware that his
property was being used illegally.'9 Courts, however, have struggled with
the "without knowledge or consent" requirement.191 The difference in
interpretations turns on a court's interpretation of the constitutional defense
established in dictum in Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.' 92 In

Calero-Toledo a yacht owned by a New York resident and leased to two
Puerto Rican residents was forfeited under a Puerto Rico forfeiture statute
similar to § 881(a)(4) of the Controlled Substances Act. 93 The yacht
contained one marijuana cigarette.194 The owner was unaware of the
forfeiture until he attempted to repossess the yacht for nonpayment.' 95 The
United States Supreme Court held that the innocence of the owner is almost
always rejected as a defense. 96 In dicta, however, the Court discussed two
circumstances when an innocent owner might have a defense to the forfeiture

entirety are "the joint owners must be married to each other; the owners must both
have title; the owners must have received title from the same conveyance; the owners
must share an equal interest; and the owners must have the right to use the entire
property." Id.
188. United States v. One Single Family Residence, 894 F.2d 1511, 1514 (11th
Cir. 1990).
189. Id. at 1516 n.6.
190. Stefan D. Cassella, The Rights of the Innocent in Forfeitures, 37 PRAc.
LAW., Apr. 1991, at 87, 90. See also 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4), (6), (7) (1988).
191. Alice Marie O'Brien, "CaughtIn The Crossfire": ProtectingThe Innocent
Owner Of Real PropertyFrom Civil Forfeiture Under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7), 65 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 521, 529 (1991).

192. 416 U.S. 663 (1974). See also Lalit K. Loomba, The Innocent Owner
Defense To RealPropertyForfeitureUnderThe Comprehensive Crime ControlAct Of
1984, 58 FORDHAM L. REv. 471, 487 (1989) (discussing Calero-Toledo in depth).
193. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 665-67.

194. Id. at 693.
195. Id. at 668.

196. Id. at 683.
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action.' 97 These exceptions have developed into what is currently known
as the innocent owner defense.
Some courts have interpreted Calero-Toledoto require the owner to show
not only that he was not involved and lacked knowledge of the transaction,
but that he also did everything he reasonably could to prevent the illegal use
of his property.' 98
Other courts completely reject the Calero-Toledo
defense.' 99 State legislatures need to address this issue and incorporate into
their state's forfeiture statute a well-defined defense for owners who did not
know their property was used for an illegal transaction.m
C. ContemplatedReform
Due to the press attention received on many of the issues discussed in
this Comment, the Missouri legislature has begun debates on how to reform
CAFA. Senate Bill 460 has been perfected by the Senate; however, it was
part of a large drug bill that was defeated.2"' Hence, there were no changes
made to CAFA during the 1992 session. Senate Bill 460 proposed such
needed changes as banning federal adoption unless the violation is a felony
in Missouri, more than one state is involved in the seizure or investigation,
and the adoption is approved by a judge after property owners receive notice
and hearing. 20' Another proposed change was that there could be no
forfeiture unless there was a criminal conviction on the violation. 20 3 If there
was no conviction then the CAFA proceeding would be stayed. 2° In
addition, the bill prohibited monetary payment in exchange for the release of
property.2 5 It also prohibited holding seized property unless a petition had
been filed within the time limit provided by section 513.607206 or a court
had granted an extension. 2° If Senate Bill 460 had become law, it would
be a significant step in reforming CAFA. Unfortunately, Senate Bill 460 is

197. Loomba, supra note 192, at 488.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 513.615 (1986).
201. S. 460, 86th Gen. Assembly (1992). Senate Bill 460 was perfected on March
11, 1992. It was defeated on May 15, 1992.
202. Id. at 24.
203. Id. at 21.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 22.
206. Section 513.607 requires law enforcement officers to report a seizure within
three days, and a petition for forfeiture must be filed within five days of the report of
a seizure. Mo. REV. STAT. § 513.607 (1986).
207. S. 460, 86th Gen. Assembly 22 (1992).
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the third such bill to fail in the last three sessions of the legislature.'
Missourians can only hope that their legislature will respond during the next
session.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Forfeiture is an excellent law enforcement tool. It forces drug dealers to
pay for the crimes they have committed. However, this benefit is being
outweighed by the anger and frustration of innocent law-abiding citizens
whose money or property is being seized without legitimate cause and
sometimes being held for months before trial.2 Forfeiture's current use has
fostered disrespect for law enforcement and the entire criminal justice
system. 210 This negative image can be overcome. By classifying forfeitures
as criminal in nature, defendants would be guaranteed the rights to which they
are constitutionally entitled. Additionally, forfeiture laws should be amended
to ensure speedy trials and keep the ultimate burden of proof on the
government. This gives defendants a real opportunity to defend against an
unfair taking of their property. Through these simple reforms the government
would continue to have an effective enforcement tool against drug dealers
without subjecting innocent citizens to unconstitutional process.
STEFFANIE STRACKE
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